Baillie Gifford

International Concentrated Growth Quarterly Update

31 December 2024



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Historical performance results for investment indexes and/or categories, generally do not reflect the deduction of transaction costs and/or custodial charges or the deduction of an investment management fee, the incurrence of which would have the effect of decreasing historical performance results. It should not be assumed that recommendations/ transactions made in the future will be profitable or will equal performance of the securities mentioned.

Potential for Profit and Loss

All investment strategies have the potential for profit and loss.

Stock Examples

Any stock examples, or images, used in this paper are not intended to represent recommendations to buy or sell, neither is it implied that they will prove profitable in the future. It is not known whether they will feature in any future portfolio produced by us. Any individual examples will represent only a small part of the overall portfolio and are inserted purely to help illustrate our investment style. A full list of portfolio holdings is available on request.

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Product Overview

International Concentrated Growth is a bottom-up equity strategy focused on exceptional international growth companies. It invests in businesses that are creating and benefiting from long-term structural changes in the economy and society. It holds 20–35 stocks, drawn from developed and emerging international markets, and has the latitude to invest up to 15% in US equities.

Risk Analysis

Key Statistics	
Number of Holdings	30
Typical number of holdings	20-35
Active Share	90%*
Rolling One Year Turnover	23%

^{*}Relative to MSCI ACWI ex US Index. Source: Baillie Gifford & Co, MSCI.

The International Concentrated Growth strategy outperformed its benchmark during the quarter and past year

The last five years have been turbulent. Our conviction in our long-term high-growth investment has therefore not only endured but been fortified through this period

Long-term equity returns are significantly influenced by a small number of exceptional businesses. Our investment philosophy is centred on identifying these future winners and patient ownership







Baillie Gifford Key Facts

Assets under management and advice	US\$272.3 bn
Number of clients	613
Number of employees	1682
Number of investment professionals	375

A quinquennial pause for reflection

Having reached the midpoint of the 2020s, it seems fitting to pause and reflect upon the extraordinary events that have shaped the investment landscape over the past five years. This period has been marked by the first global pandemic in a century, the most rapid interest rate tightening cycle in four decades and geopolitical tensions reminiscent of the Cold War era. Meanwhile, the pace of technological change has not only continued but accelerated, driven by rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI).

Through this tumultuous period, the investment returns have exhibited far greater volatility than we would ever have expected. The start of this decade saw the portfolio benefit tremendously from the conditions of the pandemic. The accelerated adoption of online services and ultraaccommodative monetary policy boosted both the growth and valuations of the holdings. However, they faced a sharp reversal as the pandemic waned. A normalisation of economic activity both slowed the growth of the digital holdings and caused surging inflation, leading to a historically rapid rise in interest rates, impacting the valuations of growth stocks. The last five years have, therefore, been turbulent and testing, yet returns have still exceeded the benchmark by approximately 6 per cent per annum1. This performance has only been possible through the power of a few big winners held patiently and in size. Our conviction in our long-term highgrowth investment philosophy has therefore not only endured but been fortified through this period. This is not to say we did not make mistakes nor that we do not need to improve. Rather, it is to make clear our unwavering conviction in our approach and its ability to deliver future outperformance if executed effectively.

There are three key parts to our investment approach:

01. Concentration

Academic research shows that concentrated portfolios tend to outperform their more diversified counterparts2. Research indicates that while portfolio managers do have a few good ideas, they tend not to have that many of them. Intuitively, this makes sense; after all, it is rare for an individual or even a team to have 50 or 100 great investment ideas. Moreover, truly great companies are rare, not plentiful. Consequently, we maintain a focused portfolio of 20–35 holdings that allows us to own only those ideas that we view as the most attractive.

Why is this hard for others to do?

Focusing on a small number of good ideas may improve long-term returns, but it usually increases short—and medium-term volatility. This often leads to career risk for the portfolio manager and raises the potential for client losses for the investment firm. We believe we have two sources of edge that allow us to better cope with volatility. The first is internal: our century-old partnership structure which provides stability reducing the perceived career risk felt by investors. The second is external: alignment with our high-quality client base. This matters because you can only be as steadfast as the clients whose money you manage. For our clients, we usually represent a relatively small allocation alongside many other managers who provide the necessary diversification.

02. A focus on outliers

Academic research shows that value creation in the stock market is driven by a very small number of big winners3. Most companies simply do not matter. We therefore focus on those that could matter - those that have the potential to best exploit the asymmetry of equity investing. Our strategy seeks to identify and own as many of these outliers as we can.

Why is this hard for others to do?


It requires imagination rather than spreadsheet modelling, a willingness to embrace uncertainty and tolerance for looking very foolish when you are wrong. Investing in Tesla was for many years decried as foolhardy because it was heavily unprofitable, traded at sky-high spot multiples and was run by an unconventional and highly controversial founder. Had Tesla not worked it would have been deemed an obviously imprudent investment. However, it was precisely because it was uncertain and unconventional that it had the possibility of delivering extraordinary returns. When investing in outliers the mistakes you make will usually appear very embarrassing. Nonetheless, getting a single outlier right can make up for a great number of investment mistakes as demonstrated by the below:

¹ Based on the representative account

² "Best Ideas" by Cohen, Polk and Silli (2009) and "Diversification versus Concentration ... and the Winner is?" by Yeung et al (2012).

 $^{^3}$ 1.3% of stocks contributed for all global net wealth creation between 1990 and 2018. "Do Global Stocks Outperform US Treasury Bills?" by Bessembinder et al (2019).

Asymmetric returns



Maximum drawdown during period

Return of International Concentrated Growth stocks (top 10 and bottom 10 return in \$)

Source: Revolution, MSCI. International Concentrated Growth composite. US dollar. Ten years to 30 November 2024. Some stocks were only held for part of the period.

03. Exceptional outcomes require time and patience

We invest with a 5–10 year time horizon, recognising that it takes time for great companies to emerge and demonstrate their value. This approach requires patience through the inevitable setbacks and resistance to taking profits too early. Academic evidence shows that progress is never a straight line, even among the best investments in stock market history – all of which have experienced brutal falls in their share price along the path to success4. Apple has experienced three drawdowns of over 70 per cent, while Amazon has fallen over 90 per cent. In the pursuit of outliers, setbacks are de rigueur, and patience is a prerequisite.

Why is this hard for others to do?

Being long term means delaying gratification. It requires the underrated art of inaction amidst a cacophony of noise. As Charlie Munger used to say, "The big money is not in the buying and selling, but in the waiting." We had several companies that fell 60–75 per cent after the pandemic such as NVIDIA, MercadoLibre and Spotify. However, by waiting rather than bailing out, all three went on to eventually exceed their pandemic highs in 2024. All featured as significant positive contributors to performance last year, as well as over a more meaningful period of the last five years. In the case of Spotify, it soared six-fold from its nadir in 2022. Nonetheless, this

patience comes with a trade-off. We can sometimes be too slow to move on from investments that are not working, as we were with Alibaba, NIO and Zalando, all of which we have sold over the past 15 months. Nonetheless, given the asymmetry within equity investing, this is a conscious trade-off. We would far rather be patient owners than fast sellers.

Constant evolution

Our conviction in our investment philosophy may be steadfast, but that does not mean we cannot improve how we implement it

We are currently focused on two improvements. The first is ensuring that we are as broad as possible in our search for outliers. This is because in investing, the worst mistakes you can make are sins of omission. These are far more harmful than the embarrassing but less impactful sins of commission. It therefore bothers us greatly that we did not own Novo Nordisk much earlier, having added it to the portfolio last year. Arguably, its potential to address the global problem of obesity first became visible as early as 2017 when it released Ozempic for type 2 diabetes. It then became increasingly obvious with the launch of Wegovy as an obesity treatment in 2021. Novo Nordisk's shares have now risen well over 3x since 2020. Going forward, we need to ensure we are casting a sufficiently wide net in our search for outliers to ensure we are open to their appearance across different industries, company sizes and maturities. We must be open-minded as to the sources of transformational growth.

⁴ "Extreme Stock Market Performers, Part 1: Expect Some Drawdowns" by Bessembinder (2020).

The second improvement is to ensure we devote sufficient time to evaluating not just a company's potential end state, but also the path it must navigate to reach that potential. In other words, to consider the journey as well as the destination. Sticking with the healthcare theme, we still think we were right to identify that Moderna, the mRNA biotechnology company, had outlier potential given the broad application of its technology platform to everything from the flu right the way through to cancer. Nonetheless, we failed to properly think through the impact of falling Covid-19 vaccine profits as well as the significant time and hurdles the company would face in bringing new therapeutics to market. We should have realised that the journey ahead would be bumpy and had a holding size that appropriately reflected this. Our conviction in Moderna remains, but it will likely still be a few years until our hypothesis is proven or not.

A promising backdrop for growth investors

The pandemic created a bubble in growth assets that painfully burst. When bubbles burst investors are often chastened and scarred. After the dotcom bubble burst, a generation of investors was left wary of investing in 'risky' internet companies. The irony, of course, is that they would have been best served spending the next two decades investing in little else. After such a difficult period for active growth managers, there is now a natural gravitational pull toward perceived safety, predictability and convention.

We feel no such pull; rather, we welcome the possibility that our own approach is becoming more distinctive from others. As the market focuses on slower but steadier growth companies beyond the US technology behemoths, it enables us to buy uncertain but potentially highly rewarding long-term growth companies at lower valuations. This is demonstrated in the premium being paid for our portfolio's growth which is lower now than it has been for many years, relative to its own history and relative to the index. The portfolio's price-to-earnings-growth ratio is currently 1x, which is less than half its five-year historic average and less than the index which is on 1.5x.

What matters, though, is not just the price we are being asked to pay for long-term growth businesses, but also whether the broader environment is conducive to their emergence and flourishing. Talking to the leaders of companies around the world there is a clear commonality: a belief that the pace of technological change is faster now than it has ever been. This bodes well for growth investors because change creates opportunities for existing industries to be disrupted and entirely new ones to be created. In a fast-changing world, those companies vaunted for their perceived safety and predictability can be the most at risk. In a world of change, you should want to own disruptive growth companies.

We see four large opportunities going forward within international markets.

The first is the ability to own crucial parts of the supply chain for global compute (including Al). We own TSMC, the world's increasingly dominant chip manufacturer, which is compounding earnings at 30 per cent, yet trades on just 18x next year's earnings. We also own ASML, a company with a monopoly position in supplying the world with the latest lithography machines, which are arguably the most complicated in the world.

The second opportunity is the ability to own companies that are digitising emerging economies. In emerging economies, digitation is often both more nascent but also more valuable given the paucity of offline development. In Latin America, ecommerce penetration is still half the rate of the US providing a significant growth opportunity for market leader MercadoLibre. In the dynamic and fast-growing ASEAN region, a similar opportunity is available for SEA. For Nubank in Latin America, the opportunity is to disrupt expensive and inefficient banking systems that fail to properly serve much of the population.

The third opportunity is the ability to own truly iconic European heritage brands such as Hermès and Ferrari, which have demonstrated profound pricing power even in the most challenging of economic environments. These are both slower-growing businesses, but we believe they are truly unique in their longevity and quality of their financial characteristics, thus still enabling outlier returns over sufficiently long time periods. Few companies might have a genuine chance of still being successful growing businesses a century from now, but we suspect both Hermès and Ferrari are strong contenders.

The fourth and final opportunity is to benefit from the advancement of Al. We have owned NVIDIA for over eight years now and recognise that the spoils of Al have so far been highly concentrated in a small number of US tech giants. However, should the technology fulfil its potential, we expect to see value increasingly realised across a broader range of companies. Al can be thought of as an ever-improving toolkit and the companies best placed to use that toolkit will be those with large amounts of proprietary data, software expertise and a culture of innovation. In each of these dimensions, our portfolio companies should be well-placed: whether it is Nubank using Al to improve the underwriting of loans for its 100 million customers, Shopify creating an Al-powered sidekick to help merchants run their business or Spotify using Al to improve music discovery.

Final thoughts

The recent period has been unusually challenging. Although our performance over the last five years has been very strong, we recognise that when measured over the last three years starting from the peak of the pandemic, the numbers are strongly negative. As we progress through next year, our three-year performance numbers should materially improve as the starting point for measurement will begin to fall after the pandemic boom. Concurrently, our five-year numbers will start to be measured from the pandemic period leading them to worsen significantly as this volatile period works its way through our performance history.

We are encouraged to end the year on a positive trajectory having strongly outperformed the benchmark in 2024. This demonstrates both that performance is improving and that past performance was not predicated on a bygone era of low interest rates and cheap capital. Instead, it is and will remain predicated on our ability to identify, own and hold on to a small number of big winners. With the portfolio growing earnings in the last 12 months at 24 per cent, compared to the decline of 5 per cent in the index, we believe we have a portfolio of companies that are showing the necessary ingredients to deliver exceptional returns versus our benchmark in the years ahead.

Performance 07

Performance Objective

3%+ p.a. over 5 year rolling periods vs index.

The performance objective is aspirational and is not guaranteed. We don't use it to compile the portfolio and returns will vary. A single performance objective may not be appropriate across all vehicles and jurisdictions. We may not meet our investment objectives if, for example, our growth investment style is out of favour, or we misjudge the long-term earnings growth of our holdings.

Periodic Performance

GBP	Composite Net (%)	Benchmark (%)	Difference (%)
3 Months	1.8	-0.9	2.8
1 Year	20.8	8.0	12.8
3 Year	-4.1	4.0	-8.1
5 Year	10.3	5.8	4.5
10 Year	15.1	7.6	7.5
Since Inception	13.6	8.0	5.6
USD	Composite Net (%)	Benchmark (%)	Difference (%)
3 Months	-4.9	-7.5	2.6
1 Year	18.7	6.1	12.6
3 Year	-6.6	1.3	-7.9
5 Year	9.1	4.6	4.5
10 Year	12.6	5.3	7.3
Since Inception	11.5	6.0	5.5
EUR	Composite Net (%)	Benchmark (%)	Difference (%)
3 Months	2.5	-0.3	2.8
1 Year	26.6	13.2	13.4
3 Year	-3.6	4.6	-8.2
5 Year	10.8	6.3	4.5
10 Year	14.4	7.0	7.4
Since Inception	12.5	6.9	5.6
CAD	Composite Net (%)	Benchmark (%)	Difference (%)
3 Months	1.2	-1.5	2.7
1 Year	29.5	15.7	13.7
3 Year	-2.4	5.8	-8.3
5 Year	11.3	6.8	4.5
10 Year	15.1	7.6	7.5
Since Inception	12.0	6.5	5.6
AUD	Composite Net (%)	Benchmark (%)	Difference (%)
3 Months	6.5	3.6	2.9
1 Year	30.8	16.9	13.9
3 Year	-1.4	6.9	-8.3
5 Year	11.9	7.3	4.6
10 Year	15.8	8.3	7.5
Since Inception	12.7	7.1	5.6

Annualised periods ended 31 December 2024. 3 Month & 1 Year figures are not annualised.

Inception date: 31 March 2004

Figures may not sum due to rounding. Benchmark is MSCI ACWI ex US Index.

Source: Revolution, MSCI.

The International Concentrated Growth composite is more concentrated than the MSCI ACWI ex US Index.

Performance 80

Discrete Performance

GBP	31/12/19- 31/12/20	31/12/20- 31/12/21	31/12/21- 31/12/22	31/12/22- 31/12/23	31/12/23- 31/12/24
Composite Net (%)	84.7	0.1	-32.4	8.0	20.8
Benchmark (%)	7.7	9.3	-4.9	9.7	8.0
USD	31/12/19- 31/12/20	31/12/20- 31/12/21	31/12/21- 31/12/22	31/12/22- 31/12/23	31/12/23- 31/12/24
Composite Net (%)	90.6	-0.8	-39.9	14.4	18.7
Benchmark (%)	11.1	8.3	-15.6	16.2	6.1
EUR	31/12/19- 31/12/20	31/12/20- 31/12/21	31/12/21- 31/12/22	31/12/22- 31/12/23	31/12/23- 31/12/24
Composite Net (%)	74.9	6.7	-36.0	10.6	26.6
Benchmark (%)	1.9	16.5	-10.0	12.3	13.2
CAD	31/12/19- 31/12/20	31/12/20- 31/12/21	31/12/21- 31/12/22	31/12/22- 31/12/23	31/12/23- 31/12/24
Composite Net (%)	87.3	-1.6	-35.6	11.4	29.5
Benchmark (%)	9.2	7.4	-9.4	13.1	15.7
AUD	31/12/19- 31/12/20	31/12/20- 31/12/21	31/12/21- 31/12/22	31/12/22- 31/12/23	31/12/23- 31/12/24
Composite Net (%)	73.7	5.3	-35.6	13.7	30.8
Benchmark (%)	1.2	14.9	-9.5	15.5	16.9

Benchmark is MSCI ACWI ex US Index. Source: Revolution, MSCI. The International Concentrated Growth composite is more concentrated than the MSCI ACWI ex US Index.


Portfolio Overview 09

Top Ten Largest Holdings

Stock Name	Description of Business	% of Portfolio
MercadoLibre	Latin American e-commerce and fintech platform	11.7
Spotify	Streaming platform for audible content	10.6
NVIDIA	Designer of Graphics Processing Units and accelerated computing technology	7.1
TSMC	Semiconductor manufacturer	6.7
Adyen	Online payments platform	6.3
ASML	Semiconductor equipment manufacturer	5.2
Hermès International	Luxury goods	4.4
Meituan	Chinese online services platform	4.3
Ferrari	Designs and manufactures luxury cars	4.3
Shopify	Cloud-based commerce platform provider	4.2
Total		64.7

Figures may not sum due to rounding.


Sector Weights



		%
1	Consumer Discretionary	37.0
2	Information Technology	23.3
3	Communication Services	16.4
4	Financials	11.2
5	Health Care	4.6
6	Consumer Staples	3.2
7	Industrials	1.7
8	Materials	0.1
9	Cash	2.7

Figures may not sum due to rounding.

Regional Weights



		%
1	Europe (ex UK)	42.1
2	Emerging Markets	37.0
3	North America	13.3
4	UK	4.3
5	Developed Asia Pacific	0.6
6	Cash	2.7

Voting Activity

Votes Cast in Favour		Votes Cast Against Votes Abstained/Withheld		eld	
Companies	4	Companies	None	Companies	None
Resolutions	20	Resolutions	None	Resolutions	None

Company Engagement

Engagement Type	Company
Environmental	Kering SA, Moderna, Inc., PDD Holdings Inc., Sea Limited, Shopify Inc., Tencent Holdings Limited, Tesla, Inc.
Social	Kering SA, PDD Holdings Inc., Sea Limited, Tencent Holdings Limited
Governance	ASML Holding N.V., Kering SA, Kinnevik AB, Moderna, Inc., Shopify Inc., Tesla, Inc.
Strategy	Moderna, Inc., Sea Limited, Tencent Holdings Limited

Company **Engagement Report** ASML Holding N.V. Objective: We had a call with Terri Kelly, the chair of the remuneration committee, to discuss the committee's proposed changes to the executive remuneration policy. Discussion: The company must seek shareholder approval of its executive remuneration policy every three years. Ahead of the 2025 annual general meeting, the remuneration committee consulted with its top shareholders on proposed changes to the policy. This discussion built upon others we have had with Kelly, and we continue to be encouraged by their proactive approach and genuine openness to stakeholder engagement. This year, we were pleased to learn that feedback we had previously provided was being incorporated into the new policy. In particular, we had encouraged ASML, when benchmarking executive remuneration, to use a list of peers more directly comparable to ASML. We also encouraged them to increase their ambition regarding the relative share price targets within the long-term incentive plan. Both changes are positive and will help align executive remuneration outcomes and shareholder value creation. Outcome: The consultation process is still ongoing. However, we continue to support ASML's approach to executive remuneration and think all proposed changes are justified. Objective: We met with Forrest Li, founder and chief executive officer (CEO), to discuss the Sea Limited company's progress in overcoming recent challenges and to evaluate future growth and profitability. Discussion: Our conversation revealed strong execution and positive momentum in all three business segments (e-commerce, fintech and gaming) in the face of fierce competition. The e-commerce business Shopee has established a commanding position in the ASEAN region through superior logistics capabilities and local market understanding. Their financial services arm, MariBank, has shown impressive growth with approximately 12 million users. Their gaming division has demonstrated resilience with bookings growth of 25 per cent year-over-year, driven by innovative localisation strategies and improved game optimisation. The two areas that have improved faster than Li expected are Shopee's expansion in Brazil and Sea Ltd's large franchise game, Free Fire. Outcome: We gained an understanding of how Forrest Li has successfully navigated the significant challenges of a gaming downturn, competition from companies like TikTok, rising financing costs, and the impact of post-pandemic reopening, to position SEA for continued growth. **Tencent Holdings Limited** Objective: To better understand Tencent's updated data management practices and suggest actions to align with the international best practices; to learn the company's signature value-added social projects. Discussion: We continue our dialogue on data management with Tencent as supportive

shareholders who are challenged by their non-compliant list status at a third-party environmental, social and governance (ESG) rating agency. We discussed the international norms of data protection and the regulatory landscape of data in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Tencent has made significant progress in making the content policy transparent to its users and disclosing external requests for data for public scrutiny. The company reiterated that as a United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) signatory, it firmly upholds the commitments to data and privacy protection. The next steps will focus on further strengthening the technology power to prevent cybersecurity attacks, especially in gaming and its fintech services. We also discussed the signature projects conducted by Tencent's sustainable social value team. One example highlighted by the company is the cornerstone project with RMB 10 billion funding in to support Chinese young scientists in their fundamental research. Other topics we discussed during the meeting include Tencent's decarbonisation pathway and internal control of the anti-corruption campaign.

Outcome: The meeting reassured us about the concrete practices on data protection. We believe the company respect and have sought a good balance between local laws and international norms. They will continue to improve data management as new challenges occur in the cyber world. We appreciate the company's mindset to carry on bigger social responsibility whenever they see a gap and their initiative to solve problems with stakeholders like the government and academia.

Voting 12

Votes Cast in Favour

Companies	Voting Rationale
Adyen NV, BYD Company 'H', Kinnevik, PDD Holdings Inc	We voted in favour of routine proposals at the aforementioned meeting(s).

Votes Cast Against

We did not vote against any resolutions during the period.

Votes Abstained

We did not abstain on any resolutions during the period.

Votes Withheld

We did not withhold on any resolutions during the period.

Transaction Notes 13

New Purchases

Stock Name	Transaction Rationale
Novo Nordisk	Novo Nordisk is a Danish pharmaceutical company and a global leader in metabolic diseases. We took a position as we believe the obesity market has the potential to be a \$350bn opportunity over the next 10 years, with Novo Nordisk set to take a sizeable share. The insatiable demand in the self-pay market for Novo's drugs is unprecedented in the history of chronic diseases and is set to continue. Its strong clinical evidence and manufacturing capacity will result in a growing stream of cash flows that it can use to advance its obesity pipeline, which is already the strongest in the industry. This includes developing drugs with improved efficacy, those that can be taken orally or with new mechanisms of action, further expanding the market.

There were no complete sales during the period.

Legal Notices 14

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